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Abstract
The paper investigates the structure of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice
functions – CSP scfs, for short – whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a
given, arbitrarily large, set A of alternatives. The study is conducted in the case
where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference among elements of A, and
the domain of the scfs consists of preference profiles over a society V of arbitrary
cardinality. A representation formula for the two-valued CSP scfs is obtained that,
ultimately, provides the structure of such functions. Representation formulas are
more specific than characterization results since they de facto characterize, but also
furnish an operational way to construct all scfs under consideration.
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The structure of two-valued ... Introduction
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show a representation formula for strategy-proof social
choice functions
φ : P → A,
under the following assumptions:
• A is a set of alternatives having cardinality at least two;
• V is an arbitrary set of voters (i.e. the society V is not necessarily finite);
• P is the set of all profiles P = (Pv)v∈V (universal domain hypothesis), consisting of
weak orders Pv on A
1 - one for every member v of the society;
• the range of φ is of cardinality two.
We adopt the term two-valued social choice function for a φ with range of cardinality two.
If A is itself of cardinality two and φ is onto, we shall use the term binary social choice
function. We consider social choice functions that are coalitionally strategy-proof, i.e. no
group of agents has incentives to form a coalition that can manipulate the social choice for
their own advantage with false reporting (see Definition 2.3). To be concise, sometimes we
shall write scf to mean social choice function, and CSP to mean coalitionally strategy-proof.
Representation formulas are more specific than characterization results since they de facto
characterize, but also furnish an operational way to produce the desired scfs. Therefore we
are addressing a rather natural question and, more, we are considering this question even
in the simplest case of functions whose range is of cardinality two. Despite all this, until
now not too many representation formulas can be found in the literature for tackling the
case wherein voters may express indifference between alternatives.
When we assume that every voter can only express strict orderings, namely when we limit
the domain of φ by considering only strict profiles2, we have the following representation
results (Theorem 1.1 (i) and Theorem 1.1 (ii)).
Theorem 1.1 The strategy-proof social choice functions defined on the set of all strict
profiles, are all, and only, the following functions P 7→ φF(P ).
(i) Functions with range {a, b} ⊆ A of cardinality two:
φF(P ) =
{
a, if {v ∈ V : a ≻ b, according to Pv} ∈ F
b, if {v ∈ V : a ≻ b, according to Pv} /∈ F
where F is a nonempty family of coalitions of voters which is closed under supersets.
1Rational preference relations, or just preference relations, according to the books by Mas-Colell et al.
[11] and by Aliprantis and Border [1] respectively. So, throughout the sequel, a profile P = (Pv)v∈V ,
consists of complete, transitive relations Pv on a set A of alternatives.
2If every Pv is also antisymmetric, i.e. it is a strict order (one would say strict preference according to
[11] or, reflexive linear order according to [1]), then we say that the profile P is strict.
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(ii) Functions with finite range A∗ ⊆ A of cardinality three or more:
φF(P ) = the unique alternative a ∈ A
⋆ such that D(a, P ) ∈ F ,
where F is an ultrafilter of coalitions, and, for x ∈ A⋆, we denote by D(x, P ) the set
{v ∈ V : v has x as his top choice among the alternatives in A⋆, according to Pv}.
The formulation of (i) and (ii) can be found in Rao et al. [15, Proposition 4.1, and Theorem
3.5, respectively]. In the case of a finite society V and with A = {a, b}, (i) is due to Larsson
and Svensson [10, Theorem 2]3, whereas (ii) combines results from Ishikava and Nakamura
[7], Mihara [12], Pazner and Wesley [13].
The scenario in which voters are allowed to express indifference among alternatives, is
much more complex. This is the setting of Barbera` et al. [4], where a strategy-proof
characterization is offered in [4, Theorem 1] for two-valued social choice functions. To
the best of our knowledge, only recently Lahiri and Pramanik [9, Theorem 1] considered
the problem of obtaining a representation formula. They gave a rather difficult formula
for representing binary social choice functions in the framework of a finite society. For
an arbitrary society (i.e. finite or infinite) a simpler representation theorem for binary
social functions has been obtained by Basile et al. [5, Theorem 4.2]. However, we do not
know representation formulas when indifference is permitted for cases such as functions
with range of cardinality at least three and even two-valued functions. In other words,
we do not know results that generalize in a straightforward manner Theorem 1.1 to the
case of weak orderings. In the following we aim to give for the first time a formula for
two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions. We will be considering the case of the
range of cardinality three or more in a subsequent paper.
Facing two-valued functions rather than merely binary ones, entails new serious difficulties
that must be tackled. This is so because the strategy-proofness is not sufficient to guarantee
that the irrelevant alternatives, i.e. those not belonging to the range, play no role. In
general, a strategy-proof social choice function defined on all weak profiles may not be
independent of irrelevant alternatives. Take for example, A = {a, b, c} and let one profile
P have every voter being indifferent between a and b but prefers them over c. Let a second
profile Q have every voter being indifferent between a and b but prefers c over a and b. Then
φ(P ) need not be equal to φ(Q) and such φ with range {a, b} can be easily constructed
(see Example 2.4, infra).
In the binary setting a central role is played by coalitions of indifferent agents. Here, due
to the presence of further alternatives besides those in the range, we needed to give the
analogous role to some profiles of preferences that we named partial indifference profiles.
This is described in more detail below. A consistent extension to the present setting of
the characterization of strategy-proofness by means of the concept of compatibility with
3The Authors describe the rule φF as voting by committees (cfr. Peleg [14], Barbera` et al. [2]).
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dominance introduced in [5], was hence necessary. Since our setting coincides with that of
Barbera` et al. [4], we also compare their characterization result with ours.
In [10], [9] and [5], the representation theorems rely on the concept of nonempty super-
set closed families of coalitions (also named committees according to the Social Choice
literature). Here a slight modification is necessary to treat the complexity of all possible
situations: it is necessary to consider the possibility of empty families and also that a family
contains the empty set, i.e. it is the power set. Given that, the structure of two-valued
strategy-proof scfs we have discovered in Definition 4.1, Theorems 4.4 and 5.2, looks for-
mally like that of the binary particular case we achieved in [5, Theorem 4.2]. However, we
wish to emphasize that it is by no means a straight extension of the previous representation,
being the step from binary to two-valued functions quite considerable.
Let us now illustrate the structure of CSP scfs whose range is of cardinality two, say a
subset {a, b} of an arbitrary set A of alternatives. For the purpose of giving a clearer
intuition, we move along the steps of the increasing difficulties of the scenarios we consider.
Strict profiles only. Starting with aggregating strict profiles in a two-valued social
choice, Theorem 1.1 (i) says that CSP scfs φ are identifiable with committees by means
of the equation φ = φF . The fixed ultrafilters generated by the agents are among the
possible committees, so that we are considering, as it is correct to do, also the so called
dictatorial scfs. Since the latter do not exhaust all CSP scfs, if we want to describe all of
them, we need to introduce functions such as φF that generalize dictatorial functions. This
approach resembles Kirman and Sondermann [8], wherein physical, visible, agents (i.e.,
fixed ultrafilters) are extended by adding invisible agents (i.e., arbitrary ultrafilters). For
our purposes here, we need a further enlargement: We need to include committees.
Binary scfs. Moving to binary scfs with indifference, a first point is that a single com-
mittee is not sufficient to give a CSP scf. However, a large class of CSP scfs is susceptible
of a “sequential” description like the one that we are going to present. We first expose the
description in a simplified manner.
[5, Example 2.4]: Let V be an at most countable set; enumerate its members as v = 1, 2, ....
Let the scf be defined as follows: If the profile P admits at least one agent for whom the
two alternatives are not indifferent, then the social choice is dictated by the first (according
to the natural ordering of V ) non-indifferent agent; for the profile corresponding to the
unanimous indifference, we assume the social choice is x ∈ {a, b} (having fixed such an x).
Mimicking the previous description, for many binary CSP scfs φ one can find a well ordered
collection F0,F1, ...,Fλ, . . . of committees
4 such that the social choice that aggregates a
profile P is that of the first (according to the ordering of Λ) committee which is not
indifferent5, if there is one such committee; otherwise the choice will be the one that φ
4In general λ will describe an arbitrary well ordered set Λ
5For a committee F , the indifference between a and b means that the set {v ∈ V : a ≻
∼Pv
b} is in F
and, at the same time, the set {v ∈ V : b ≻
∼Pv
a} is in the committee F◦ dual to F . Hence, when F
is not indifferent either we have that {v ∈ V : a ≻
Pv
b} ∈ F (the committee choice is a) or we have that
{v ∈ V : b ≻
Pv
a} ∈ F◦ (the committee choice is b).
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associates to the profile of unanimous indifference. This sequential structure is very simple
and intuitive, and in [5] it is shown to capture many CSP scfs, but not all. Due to this
difficulty (i.e. replacing committees with well ordered collections of committees is not
sufficient) in [5] it has been proved that to obtain all binary CSP scfs, one can keep the
sequential structure described above as long as the role played by committees is played by
pairs (I,F) consisting of a proper subset I of V where indifference is concentrated, and
a committee on the coalition V \ I. This sounds not less intuitive than the sequential
nature of a CSP scf. Indeed we are saying that once in a profile a set (maybe empty) of
agents is indifferent, the others will be requested to decide. For a pair (I,F), that could
be thought of as an “extended committee”, indifference or not must be adequately defined
(cfr. Section 3 of [5]).
Two-valued scfs. Since irrelevant alternatives count, it is clear that the decisive role
cannot be merely played by the mentioned pairs (I,F). It is exactly to tackle this difficulty
that pairs (pi,F), i.e. a further enlargement of the notion of committee, comes into the
scene: pi (partial indifference profile) is a profile not necessarily defined for all agents, its
domain I identifies agents that are indifferent between a and b, but also neutralizes the
role of the irrelevant alternatives by blocking the preferences of the members of I on them;
as in the binary case, F is a committee on V \ I. Giving, by means of Definition 3.2,
a proper meaning to indifference or strict preference for a pair (pi,F), our representation
theorem reveals that the structure of all two-valued CSP scfs is the following: for every CSP
scf φ one can find a well ordered collection (pi0,F0), (pi
1,F1), ..., (pi
λ,Fλ), . . . of extended
committees (which we name a double collection, Definition 3.4) such that the social choice
that aggregates a profile P is the choice of the first (according to the ordering of Λ) extended
committee which is not indifferent, if there is one; otherwise the choice will be the one that
φ associates to a profile of unanimous indifference between a and b.
Moreover we also point out that the possibility of fixing a priori, freely, the parameter x
of the representation6 has to be considered jointly with the fact that the other parameter
- the double collection 〈Π, F〉 - will change coherently.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the dominance relation between
profiles and the concept of compatibility of a social choice function with the dominance.
The characterization of strategy-proofness by means of compatibility is in Theorem 2.10
and the Section ends with a comparison of compatibility with the notions of essentially ab-
based and ab-monotonic due to Barbera` et al [4]. Section 3 presents some notions which
are preparatory to the definition of index of a profile, and the index itself. This is a tool for
the definition in Section 4 of some special scfs of sequential form, that we call of type ψ.
Theorem 4.4 shows that such functions are strategy-proof, whereas to the fact that there
are no other two-valued strategy-proof scfs is devoted Section 5. The general representation
result is Theorem 5.2, whose proof is given in the final Appendix.
6One can choose ex ante x as the value of the scf on any profile of unanimous indifference between the
alternatives in the range.
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2 Strategy-proofness
Let W(A) be the set of weak orderings over the set A of alternatives. Functions pi from
subsets of V toW(A) are named partial profiles of preferences. A partial profile is therefore
pi = (piv)v∈I where I is a subset of V and piv ∈ W(A) for every v ∈ I. In case I = V ,
we speak of a (total) profile of preferences, omitting “total”. For the class of all (total)
profiles we use the notation P . For the case in which the domain is the empty set, we
reserve the name of empty profile. For a profile P = (Pv)v∈V we shall also use the notation
P = [PI , PIc] if I is a subset of V and PI , PIc are the obvious restrictions PI = (Pv)v∈I ,
PIc = (Pv)v/∈V of P
7. Extending this notation to arbitrary partitions of V or to partial
profiles is straightforward.
With reference to an orderingW on the set A of alternatives, as usual, the notation x ≻
∼W
y
stands for (x, y) ∈ W , the notation x ≻
W
y stands for
[
(x, y) ∈ W and (y, x) /∈ W
]
, and the
notation x ∼
W
y stands for
[
(x, y) ∈ W and (y, x) ∈ W
]
.
Definition 2.1 Let a and b be two distinct alternatives. A partial {a, b}-indifference
profile is a partial profile pi such that for every voter v ∈ dom (pi) (the domain of pi) one
has a ∼
πv
b.
Trivially, the empty profile is a partial {a, b}-indifference profile. The class of all partial
{a, b}-indifference profiles will be denoted by P(a ∼ b). It contains profiles of unanimous
indifference between a and b also, namely profiles P = (Pv)v∈V such that a ∼
Pv
b, ∀v ∈ V.
Notice that if A consists of two alternatives a, b only, then P(a ∼ b) can be identified, via
the mapping pi 7→ dom(pi), with the power set of V .
Throughout the sequel, φ : P → A stands for a scf. Dealing with societies of any cardinality,
the notion of strategy-proofness we adopt is based on coalitions of individuals rather than
on a single individual. As usual, coalition is synonymous to nonempty subset of V .
Definition 2.2 Let φ be scf. We say that a coalition D can manipulate a profile P under
φ if there is another profile Q such that
• every voter v in Dc has the same preference order in both P and Q, i.e. Pv = Qv;
• every voter v in D prefers φ(Q) to φ(P ) according to Pv, i.e. φ(Q) ≻
Pv
φ(P ).
When the two conditions above are verified we say that the coalition D manipulates the
proflile P by presenting (or reporting) the profile Q.
A desirable property of a scf is that no group of agents has incentives to form a coalition
that, with false reporting, can manipulate the social outcome for their own advantage. This
is at the basis of the following definition.
7We denote by the superscript c the complement of a set.
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Definition 2.3 We say that a scf φ is coalitionally strategy-proof (CSP, for short) if
no coalition of voters can manipulate any profile under φ.
If in the previous definitions we replace arbitrary coalitions with singletons, the notion we
identify is that of individual strategy-proofness.
It is obvious that every CSP social choice function is individually strategy-proof. On the
other hand it is well known that the two concepts of strategy-proofness, individual and
coalitional, coincide for the case of V being finite, whereas they do not coincide if V is
infinite.
Example 2.4 The purpose of this example is to clarify that strategy-proofness does not
imply independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let V,A be consisting of two agents {v1, v2}
and three alternatives {a, b, c}. A strategy-proof scf φ with range {a, b} can be defined as
follows. If for the profile P either one of the following
b ≻
Pv1
a; c ≻
Pv1
a ∼
Pv1
b; a ∼
Pv1
b ≻
Pv1
c & b ≻
Pv2
a;
holds true, then we define φ(P ) = b. In all the other cases we define φ(P ) = a.
Trivially, if we take the profiles P and Q as below
v1 v2
Profile P a ∼ b ≻ c a ∼ b ≻ c
φ
−→ a
Profile Q c ≻ a ∼ b c ≻ a ∼ b
φ
−→ b
we have that φ(P ) = a and φ(Q) = b. We have a similar outcome if we take P and Q such
that
v1 v2
Profile P a ∼ b ≻ c a ≻ b ≻ c
φ
−→ a
Profile Q c ≻ a ∼ b a ≻ b ≻ c
φ
−→ b
This is so even if the function φ is strategy-proof and the profiles P and Q are identical
on {a, b}. The fact that φ cannot be manipulated can be easily shown. Suppose, on
the contrary, that a voter v can manipulate a profile P reporting a profile Q, we have:
φ(Q) ≻
Pv
φ(P ) and P−v = Q−v. Without loss of generality we can suppose that φ(Q) = b.
Hence we have b = φ(Q) ≻
Pv
φ(P ) = a. The voter v cannot be v1 otherwise φ(P ) is b by
definition of φ. Hence we have that v = v2 and therefore that b = φ(Q) ≻
Pv2
φ(P ) = a and
Pv1 = Qv1 . By the definition of φ, the fact that φ(Q) = b, Pv1 = Qv1 , and φ(P ) = a, we
have that necessarily a ∼
Pv1
b ≻
Pv1
c but this together with b ≻
Pv2
a would give that φ on P
takes value b, a contradiction. ✷
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Remark 2.5 It is immediate that a scf φ which is CSP, enjoys the following property:
{y ∈ Range(φ) : y ≻
Pv
φ(P ), ∀v ∈ V } = Ø, for every profile P ∈ dom(φ)
which is the well known weak Pareto optimality.
Since our purpose is to find a representation formula for CSP scfs that have range of
cardinality two, we adopt the following approach: we fix a set {a, b} ⊆ A consisting of
two distinct alternatives and produce a formula for CSP social choice functions
with range {a, b}. With this in mind, we introduce the following notations. Let a and b
be distinct alternatives and P be a profile, then we set:
– the indifferece set of voters: I(P ) = {v ∈ V : a ∼
Pv
b},
– the set of voters that prefer a to b: D(a, P ) = {v ∈ V : a ≻
Pv
b},
– the set of voters that prefer b to a: D(b, P ) = {v ∈ V : b ≻
Pv
a}.
Also useful is the following notion of {a, b}-equivalence set of two profiles P and Q.
Definition 2.6 Let P,Q be two profiles. The {a, b}-equivalence set of P and Q consists
of the voters v ∈ V for which either one of the following three statements hold true:
• Pv = Qv;
• restricted to {a, b}, the preferences Pv and Qv are identical and coincide with a ≻ b;
• restricted to {a, b}, the preferences Pv and Qv are identical and coincide with b ≻ a.
The {a, b}-equivalence set of P and Q will denoted by E(P,Q).
Comment 2.7 (about notation) For the four sets we have introduced, a more appro-
priate notation should involve the set {a, b} also: I{a,b}(P ), D{a,b}(a, P ), D{a,b}(b, P ),
E{a,b}(P,Q). The notational abuse is for the sake of simplicity. Throughout the paper
the reference to the two alternatives a and b will be unambiguous. ✷
We now introduce the following dominance relation between profiles.
Definition 2.8 Let {a, b} be two distinct alternatives in A. Given two profiles P and Q,
we say that P dominates Q and write P
{a,b}
⊐ Q if either V = E(P,Q) ∪
[
I(P ) ∩D(a,Q)
]
or V = E(P,Q) ∪
[
I(P ) ∩D(b, Q)
]
.
7
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Comment 2.7 (continuation) It is for the already invoked sake of simplicity that we
do not explicitly speak of {a, b}-dominance and, moreover, we write P ⊐ Q instead of
P
{a,b}
⊐ Q.
When in particular we have V = E(P,Q)∪
[
I(P )∩D(a,Q)
]
, we adopt the notation P
{a,b}
⊐
a
Q
that, however, we simplify as P ⊐
a
Q. In this case we shall say that the profile P b-dominates
the profile Q.
Analogously, for V = E(P,Q) ∪
[
I(P ) ∩ D(b, Q)
]
we write P
{a,b}
⊐
b
Q that we simplify as
P ⊐
b
Q. We shall say in this case that the profile P b-dominates the profile Q. ✷
Clearly the unions in the definition of dominance are disjoint unions. Notice that the
following are obviously equivalent:
• The simultaneous validity of the two dominances, P ⊐
a
Q and P ⊐
b
Q,
• The simultaneous validity of the two dominances, P ⊐
a
Q and Q ⊐
a
P ,
• The simultaneous validity of the two dominances, P ⊐
b
Q and Q ⊐
b
P ,
• V = E(P,Q)
So in general the dominance ⊐
a
(and ⊐
b
) is not antisymmetric (P ⊐
a
Q and Q ⊐
a
P 6⇒ P = Q)
although it is reflexive and transitive (not complete).
Definition 2.9 Let φ be a two-valued scf, and let {a, b} be its range. We say that φ is
compatible with the dominance relation ⊐ when
P ⊐
φ(P )
Q ⇒ φ(Q) = φ(P ).
We shall now characterize coalitional strategy-proofness in terms of dominance.
Theorem 2.10 A scf φ with range {a, b} is CSP if and only if it is compatible with ⊐.
proof: Suppose φ is compatible with ⊐ and assume that it is not CSP. This means that
profiles P,Q exist and a coalition D such that P and Q are identical on Dc and for v ∈ D
we have φ(Q) ≻
Pv
φ(P ).
Let us fix, without loss of generality, that φ(P ) = a and φ(Q) = b. Define the following
partition of D:
D1 = D(b, Q) ∩D, D2 = D(a,Q) ∩D, D3 = I(Q) ∩D.
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and a new profile R = [RDc , RD1 , RD2, RD3 ], identical to P (and Q) on D
c, to P on D1, to
Q on D3, and arbitrary on D2 as long as it guarantees a ∼
Rv
b for v ∈ D2. The figure below
describes the situation.
Profile P P b ≻ a b ≻ a b ≻ a
φ
−→ a
Profile Q P b ≻ a a ≻ b a ∼ b
φ
−→ b
Dc D1 D2 D3
Profile R P P a ∼ b Q
It is straightforward to observe that
E(R,Q) = Dc ∪D1 ∪D3; E(R,P ) = D
c ∪D1.
This entails
R ⊐
a
Q and R ⊐
b
P.
Because of the compatibility assumption, φ(R) must be a and b at the same time, this
produces a contradiction. Thus, if φ is compatible with ⊐ then it is CSP.
Now we prove the converse. Let us suppose that φ is CSP. We have to prove that
P ⊐
φ(P )
Q ⇒ φ(Q) = φ(P ).
Since φ(P ) ∈ {a, b}, we consider the case φ(P ) = a. The other case can be treated similarly.
Let us consider the following partition {V1, V2, V3, V4} of V :
V1 = {v ∈ V : Pv = Qv}, V2 = {v ∈ V : Pv 6= Qv;Pv|{a,b} = Qv |{a,b} = a ≻ b},
V3 = {v ∈ V : Pv 6= Qv;Pv|{a,b} = Qv |{a,b} = b ≻ a}, V4 = V \ E(P,Q),
since clearly {V1, V2, V3} is a partition of E(P,Q). The figure below illustrate the situation
we have:
P = [PV1, PV2 , PV3, PV4 ]; Q = [PV1 , QV2 , QV3, QV4 ]; PV2 6= QV2 ; PV3 6= QV3 ;[
v ∈ V2 ⇒ a ≻
Pv
b & a ≻
Qv
b
]
;
[
v ∈ V3 ⇒ b ≻
Pv
a & b ≻
Qv
a
]
;
[
v ∈ V4 ⇒ a ∼
Pv
b & a ≻
Qv
b
]
.
Profile P P a ≻ b b ≻ a a ∼ b
φ
−→ a
P 6= Q P 6= Q
Profile Q P a ≻ b b ≻ a a ≻ b
V1 V2 V3 V4
9
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We assume V1 is a proper subset of V , otherwise the assertion we need to prove, i.e.
φ(Q) = a, would be trivial since P and Q would coincide. One of the sets {V2, V3, V4} is
nonempty. Without loss of generality we assume V2 is nonempty, and, in every one of the
four possible cases determined by the nonemptyness of V3, V4, we shall prove the assertion.
Case V3 = V4 = Ø.
We have P = [PV1 , PV2] and Q = [PV1, QV2 ], therefore if φ(Q) = b, the coalition V2 manipu-
lates Q presenting P .
Case V3 = Ø;V4 6= Ø.
We have P = [PV1 , PV2, PV4 ] and Q = [PV1 , QV2 , QV4]. Define the profile S = [PV1 , QV2, PV4 ]
over which the value of φ must be a otherwise V2 presents P and manipulates S. At this
point also φ(Q) = a otherwise the coalition V4 can manipulate Q presenting S.
Case V3 6= Ø;V4 = Ø.
We have P = [PV1 , PV2, PV3 ] and Q = [PV1 , QV2 , QV3]. Define the profile S = [PV1 , QV2, PV3 ]
over which the value of φ must be a otherwise V2 presents P and manipulates S. At this
point also φ(Q) = a otherwise the coalition V3 can manipulate S presenting Q.
Case V3 6= Ø;V4 6= Ø.
In this last case we see that φ([PV1 , QV2 , PV3, PV4 ]) = a, otherwise the coalition V2 ma-
nipulates [PV1 , QV2 , PV3, PV4] presenting P . Hence, necessarily φ([PV1, QV2 , PV3 , QV4]) = a,
otherwise V4 manipulates [PV1 , QV2 , PV3, QV4 ] presenting [PV1 , QV2, PV3 , PV4]. Finally we get
φ(Q) = a, otherwise if φ(Q) = b, V3 manipulates [PV1 , QV2 , PV3, QV4 ] presenting Q. ✷
Corollary 2.11 Let φ be a CSP scf with range {a, b}. Then
V = E(P,Q) =⇒ φ(P ) = φ(Q).
Remark 2.12 In Barbera` et al [4], where the society V is finite, the notion of coalitional
strategy-proofness is called weak group strategy-proofness and it is characterized as follows.
[4, Theorem 1]: if the range of φ is {a, b}, then φ is CSP if and only if it is essentially
ab-based and essentially ab-monotonic.
The purpose of this Remark is to show directly that a function φ with range {a, b} has both
the above properties if and only if it is compatible with the {a, b}-dominance relation.
We remind that according to [4],
• φ is essentially ab-based, if the following implication holds true:
P,Q ∈ P ; v ∈ I(P )⇒ Pv = Qv;
D(a, P ) = D(a,Q); D(b, P ) = D(b, Q)
]
⇒ φ(P ) = φ(Q);
• φ is essentially ab-monotonic if the following implications (1) and (2) hold true:
10
The structure of two-valued ... Strategy-proofness
(1)
 P,Q ∈ P ; v ∈ I(P ) ∩ I(Q)⇒ Pv = Qv; φ(P ) = a;D(a,Q) ⊇ D(a, P );D(b, P ) ⊇ D(b, Q)(with at least
one strict inclusion)
⇒ φ(Q) = a,
(2)
 P,Q ∈ P ; v ∈ I(P ) ∩ I(Q)⇒ Pv = Qv; φ(P ) = b;D(b, Q) ⊇ D(b, P );D(a, P ) ⊇ D(a,Q) (with at least
one strict inclusion)
⇒ φ(Q) = b.
Now we observe that the simultaneous validity of essential ab-based and ab-monotonic
conditions can be restated as the validity of both implications (1) and (2) above, without
requiring that at least one of the inclusions involved is strict (see the implications (1′) and
(2′) below). We shall in fact show that any one of the two modified implications suffices.
To see this, let us write Bi(P,Q), for a pair of profiles (P,Q), if the three conditions (distinct
for i = 1 and i = 2) below hods true:
B1(P,Q) B2(P,Q)
v ∈ I(P ) ∩ I(Q)⇒ Pv = Qv
D(a,Q) ⊇ D(a, P ) D(a, P ) ⊇ D(a,Q)
D(b, P ) ⊇ D(b, Q) D(b, Q) ⊇ D(b, P )
Given that, and observing that B2(P,Q) is the same as B1(Q,P ), we can conclude in a
straightforward manner that
Proposition 2.13 φ is essentially ab-based and essentially ab-monotonic if and only if
the following implications (1′) and (2′) hold true simultaneously:
(1′)
[
B1(P,Q), φ(P ) = a
]
⇒ φ(Q) = a,
(2′)
[
B2(P,Q), φ(P ) = b
]
⇒ φ(Q) = b.
Moreover, the simultaneous validity of both (1′) and (2′) is equivalent to the validity of
either (1′) or (2′).
On the basis of the previous Proposition, we can proceed to the direct comparison between
compatibility with dominance and essential ab-based and ab-monotonic conditions.
Proposition 2.14 Let φ be a scf with range {a, b}8. Then, φ is essentially ab-based and
essentially ab-monotonic if and only if it is compatible with
{a,b}
⊐ .
8Remind that V is not necessarily finite.
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proof: Let us assume the compatibility. In order to prove that φ is essentially ab-based
and ab-monotonic, we show the implication (1′):[
P,Q ∈ P ; v ∈ I(P ) ∩ I(Q)⇒ Pv = Qv; φ(P ) = a;
D(a,Q) ⊇ D(a, P );D(b, P ) ⊇ D(b, Q)
]
⇒ φ(Q) = a.
Once we notice that we cannot find voters v in I(P ) for which b ≻
Qv
a, whereas for agents
v ∈ I(P ) if we have that a ∼
Qv
b, then Pv = Qv, we can represent the left hand side of the
implication we have to prove as in the figure below.
Profile P D(a, P ) I(P ) D(b, P )
φ
−→ a
Profile Q a ≻ b P = Q a ≻ b a ≻ b b ≻ a a ∼ b
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5
Profile R a ≻ b R = P a ∼ b b ≻ a R = Q
Let us introduce a new profile R. With reference to the partition {D(a, P ), V1, V2, V3, V4, V5}
of the society V , we take any profile that ensures: on D(a, P ) that a ≻
Rv
b, on I(P ) = V1∪V2
is identical to P , on V3 ensures that a ∼
Rv
b, on V4 ensures that b ≻
Rv
a, is Q on the set V5.
It is straightforward to check that
V = E(R,P ) ∪ [I(R) ∩D(b, P )] = E(R,Q) ∪ [I(R) ∩D(a,Q)],
what means that the profile P is b-dominated by R and the profile Q is a-dominated by R.
By the compatibility assumption we first have that φ(R) = a and then that φ(Q) = a as
desired.
For the converse, we take into account that we can assume the validity of the implications
(1) and (2) above, without requiring the strictness of the inclusions involved. Let us
suppose now that P ⊐
φ(P )
Q. We have to obtain that φ(Q) = φ(P ). Without loss of
generality consider φ(P ) = a. We observe that we must have D(a,Q) ⊇ D(a, P ). Indeed,
if this is not the case we find, v with a ≻
Pv
b and either a ∼
Qv
b or b ≻
Qv
a. Since V =
E(P,Q) ∪ [I(P ) ∩D(a,Q)], and v /∈ E(P,Q) we get a contradiction. ✷
3 The classes Pa(pi,F) and Pb(pi,F) of profiles, and the
index of a profile
In [5, Definition 2.6], we defined superset closed families of coalitions of voters (also known
as committees in the Social Choice literature) as nonempty subsets F of 2V \ {Ø} that
12
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are closed under supersets, i.e. E ⊇ F ∈ F ⇒ E ∈ F . It will be useful to have a slight
extension of this concept for our case of two-valued, rather than binary, functions.
Definition 3.1 F is a superset closed family on a set V - and we write F ∈ SSCF (V )
- if: F ⊆ 2V , and E ⊇ F ∈ F ⇒ E ∈ F .
We shall write F ∈ SSCF to mean that for some subset D of V , F ∈ SSCF (D).
Notice that if F is empty, then it is a superset closed family.
According to the fact that an F ∈ SSCF (V ) which is nonempty either contains Ø or not,
we obviously have: in the first case F is necessarily the power set 2V ; in the second case it
is a superset closed family of coalitions, the largest one being 2V \ {Ø}.
If F ∈ SSCF (V ), setting, as in [5], E ∈ F◦ ⇔ Ec /∈ F we define the dual of F .
Trivially: F◦ ∈ SSCF (V ); F◦◦ = F ; the empty family (F = Ø) and the power set
(G = 2V ) are dual to each other; the dual of a superset closed family of coalitions is also a
superset closed family of coalitions.
In other words to the dual pairs 〈F ,F◦〉 of superset closed family of coalitions considered,
solely, in [5] we have just added the pairs 〈Ø, 2V 〉, 〈2V ,Ø〉.
Fix two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A. We shall now define two useful classes of profiles,
denoted by Pa(pi,F) and Pb(pi,F), for pi ∈ P(a ∼ b) and F ∈ SSCF (V \ dom(pi)).
Definition 3.2 Let pi a partial {a, b}-indifference profile whose domain is the set I. Let
F a superset closed family on Ic.
We say that a profile P ∈ P belongs to the class Pa(pi,F) if the following two
conditions hold:{
D(a, P ) ∩ Ic ∈ F ;
v ∈ I ⇒ either Pv = piv, or the restriction of Pv to {a, b} is a ≻ b.
Analogously, we say that P ∈ P belongs to Pb(pi,F) if :{
D(b, P ) ∩ Ic ∈ F◦;
v ∈ I ⇒ either Pv = piv, or the restriction of Pv to {a, b} is b ≻ a.
A pair (pi,F) can be thought of as an extension of the concept of superset closed family
(hence, of committee). With this in mind, Definition 3.2 can be interpreted as an extension
of preferences to (pi,F) if one says (see point 4. in the next Remark), given the profile
P , that the extended committee (pi,F) prefers a to b if P ∈ Pa(pi,F), prefers b to a if
P ∈ Pb(pi,F), and it is indifferent if P /∈ [Pa(pi,F) ∪Pb(pi,F)].
Remark 3.3 Note that:
1. Pa(pi,Ø) is empty; P ∈ Pb(pi,Ø) iff v ∈ I ⇒ either Pv = piv, or b ≻
Pv
a;
2. P ∈ Pa(pi, 2
Ic) iff v ∈ I ⇒ either Pv = piv, or a ≻
Pv
b; Pb(pi, 2
Ic) is empty.
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The relations above cover the case that pi is a (total) profile of unanimous indifference
between a and b. Indeed in this case Ic is empty and the possible choices for F on Ic are
only two (each other dual): F is empty, or is the power set of Ic (i.e. F = {Ø}).
3. If pi is the empty profile, and hence F ∈ SSCF (V ), we have: P ∈ Pa(Ø,F) iff
D(a, P ) ∈ F ; P ∈ P b(Ø,F) iff D(b, P ) ∈ F
◦.
4. The classes Pa(pi,F) and Pb(pi,F) are disjoint. Indeed, suppose P ∈ Pa(pi,F) ∩
Pb(pi,F). This gives the validity of the conditions: D(a, P )∩I
c ∈ F ; D(b, P )∩Ic ∈
F◦. In particular: D(b, P ) ∩ Ic ∈ F◦ is the same as Ic \
[
D(b, P ) ∩ Ic ∈ F◦
]
/∈ F .
But the latter set is Ic \D(b, P ) and includes D(a, P ) ∩ Ic ∈ F , a contradiction.
5. In case A contains only the two alternatives a and b, for the conditions considered
in the Definition 3.2 above to define the classes Pa(pi,F) and Pb(pi,F), the second
lines reduce simply to D(b, P ) ∩ I = Ø and to D(a, P ) ∩ I = Ø respectively.
For an ordinal β ≥ 1 (finite or not), let Λ denote the well ordered set {λ : 0 ≤ λ < β}. For
every λ ∈ Λ, let piλ denote a partial {a, b}-indifference profile.
We call well ordered collection of partial {a, b}-indifference profiles a map Π=
(piλ)λ∈Λ = {pi
λ : 0 ≤ λ < β} from a well ordered set to P(a ∼ b). Similarly, a map F from
a well ordered set to SSCF will be called well ordered collection of superset closed
families.
Definition 3.4 Let a and b two distinct alternatives. We call double collection with
respect to {a, b} a pair 〈Π, F〉 consisting of a well ordered collection Π of partial {a, b}-
indifference profiles, and a well ordered collection F of superset closed families such that:
(i) Π and F have a common well ordered domain Λ, i.e. Π= (piλ)λ∈Λ and F= (Fλ)λ∈Λ
(ii) Fλ ∈ SSCF (I
c
λ) for every λ ∈ Λ, where Iλ = dom (pi
λ).
It is possible to describe a double collection also as a well ordered collection of extended
committees.
We are now ready to introduce the notion of index of a profile. This notion is more general
than the corresponding notion considered in [5] for the case of A = {a, b}, and is the key
tool to describe the sequential structure of CSP scfs..
Definition 3.5 Given the two distinct alternatives a and b, and a double collection with
respect to {a, b} 〈(piλ)λ∈Λ, (Fλ)λ∈Λ〉, the index of a profile P , denoted by λ(P ), is:
the first element of the set {λ ∈ Λ : P ∈ Pa(pi
λ,Fλ)∪P b(pi
λ,Fλ)}, if it is nonempty;
∞, if the above set is empty.
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A symbol like λ{a,b}(P ) for the index of P , and the name of {a, b}-index would be more
appropriate9. However, we keep the shorter λ(P ), since throughout the sequel there will
be no ambiguity. Notice that if, as in [5], there are only two alternatives a and b, since
in this case partial indifference profiles can be identified with their domain, the concept of
double collection here, coincide with that in [5]. Moreover, by 5. in Remark 3.3, Definition
3.5 above reduces to [5, Definition 3.1].
4 Constructing strategy-proof social choice functions
In this section we introduce a formula (formula (⋆) below) for the construction of CSP scfs
whose ranges are of cardinality two. This formula makes use of the index λ defined before.
We shall see in the next section that every CSP scf with a range of cardinality at most two
can be constructed in this way. In other words the formula we are speaking about will give
a representation (next Theorem 5.2) for all two-valued CSP social choice functions.
Definition 4.1 A scf will be said to be of ψ-type if for a suitable choice of:
• {a, b} ⊆ A,
• x ∈ {a, b}, and
• a double collection 〈Π, F〉 with respect to {a, b},
for every profile P the corresponding value is determined as follows:
(⋆) P ∈ P 7→

a, if P ∈ Pa(pi
λ(P ),Fλ(P ))
b, if P ∈ Pb(pi
λ(P ),Fλ(P )).
x, if λ(P ) =∞
A scf of ψ-type will be denoted by ψ, omitting, for our sake of notational simplicity, the
reference to {a, b}, x and 〈Π, F〉.
The function φ of Example 2.4.
Let us consider the function φ of Example 2.4. We recognize it as defined by means of (⋆)
if we take:
• the partial {a, b}-indifference profiles pi0, pi1 defined both on {v1} respectively as
follows: a ∼
π0v1
b ≻
π0v1
c; c ≻
π1v1
a ∼
π1v1
b;
• the corresponding families F0 and F1 on {v2} respectively as follows: F0 = {{v2}} =
F◦0 ; F1 = empty, F
◦
1 = {Ø, {v2}}.
9But we should take into consideration even the double collection.
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Then we see that
a profile P belongs to Pa(pi
0,F0) iff a ≻
Pv2
b and either one of the following is true:
Pv1 = pi
0
v1 or a ≻Pv1
b;
a profile P belongs to Pb(pi
0,F0) iff b ≻
Pv2
a and either one of the following is true:
Pv1 = pi
0
v1
or b ≻
Pv1
a;
Pa(pi
1,F1) is empty whereas a profile P belongs to Pb(pi
1,F1) iff either one of the
following is true: Pv1 = pi
1
v1 or b ≻Pv1
a.
Finally, the function φ is the ψ-type scf associated to the double collection 〈(pi0, pi1), (F0,F1)〉
and to x = a. ✷
Proposition 4.2 Suppose ψ is associated to x ∈ {a, b}, and 〈Π, F〉. Suppose the double
collection consists just of one element 〈pi0,F0〉 (say β is 1). Then, the range of ψ:
(1) contains a and x, if F0 is the power set of I
c
0 (and the dual family F
◦
0 is empty)
(2) contains b and x, if F0 is empty (and the dual family F
◦
0 is the power set of I
c
0)
(3) is {a, b}, if both F0 and F
◦
0 are nonempty.
In cases (1) and (2) the scf ψ may be constant.
proof: In the argument we can omit the index 0 to pi0 and F0. Let pi be a partial {a, b}-
indifference profile whose domain is the set I. Let F be a superset closed family on Ic.
Notice that if Q is a profile that ensures that D(a,Q) = V , then by Definition 3.2 one has[
Q ∈ Pa(pi,F)⇔ I
c ∈ F ⇔ F nonempty
]
and Q /∈ Pb(pi,F).
Similarly, if R ensures that D(b, R) = V , then
R /∈ Pa(pi,F) and
[
R ∈ Pb(pi,F)⇔ I
c ∈ F◦ ⇔ F◦ nonempty
]
.
If the family F is the power set of Ic, we saw (Remark 3.3) that necessarily the class
Pb(pi,F) is empty
10, and this means that we cannot guarantee a priori the value b for ψ. If
the family F◦ is the power set of Ic, we saw that necessarily the class Pa(pi,F) is empty
11,
and this means that we cannot guarantee a priori the value a for ψ. Combining all the
above remarks, the statements (1), (2), and (3) follow. ✷
10Also: P ∈ Pa(pi,F) is the same as
[
v ∈ I ⇒ either Pv = piv or a ≻
Pv
b
]
; notice that φ(pi) = φ(Q) = a
and φ(P ) = x if the profile P ∈ P(a ∼ b) and PI 6= pi.
11Also: P ∈ Pb(pi,F) is the same as
[
v ∈ I ⇒ either Pv = piv or b ≻
Pv
a
]
.
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Corollary 4.3 Suppose ψ is associated to x ∈ {a, b}, and 〈Π, F〉. Suppose that both F0
and F◦0 are nonempty, then, the range of ψ is {a, b}.
Notice that in [5] it is always the case that for the first index 0 of Λ both F0 and F
◦
0 are
nonempty. The ψ-type functions introduced here specialize to those defined in [5].
We now have the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.4 Every ψ-type function is coalitionally strategy-proof.
proof: Suppose ψ is associated to x ∈ {a, b}, and the double collection 〈Π, F〉 with
respect to {a, b}. We assume the range is {a, b}. By appealing to Theorem 2.10 we have
to show that P ⊐
ψ(P )
Q ⇒ ψ(Q) = ψ(P ).
With this purpose in mind, we prove the following two claims under the assumption that
P ⊐
b
Q,
(claim 1)
[
λ(P ) <∞, ψ(P ) = b
]
⇒
[
Q ∈ Pb(pi
λ(P ),Fλ(P ))
]
.
(claim 2)
[
λ(Q) <∞, ψ(Q) = a
]
⇒
[
P ∈ Pa(pi
λ(Q),Fλ(Q))
]
.
The assumption that P ⊐
b
Q, i.e. V = E(P,Q) ∪
[
I(P ) ∩ D(b, Q)
]
, means that for every
voter v one of the following four circumstances holds true:
(i) Pv = Qv;
(ii) the restrictions to {a, b} of the preferences Pv and Qv are identical and coincide with
a ≻ b;
(iii) the restrictions to {a, b} of the preferences Pv and Qv are identical and coincide with
b ≻ a;
(iv) a ∼
Pv
b and b ≻
Qv
a.
proof of claim 1: By definition of ψ, we have that P ∈ Pb(pi
λ(P ),Fλ(P )). In its turn
this means:{
D(b, P ) ∩ Icλ(P ) ∈ F
◦
λ(P )
[∗] v ∈ Iλ(P ) ⇒ either Pv = pi
λ(P )
v , or the restriction of Pv to {a, b} is b ≻ a.
Since for voters in D(b, P ) we can only have either (i) or (iii), we recognize that D(b, P ) ⊆
D(b, Q), and by the superset closedness we have
D(b, Q) ∩ Icλ(P ) ∈ F
◦
λ(P ).
We also have that
[∗∗] v ∈ Iλ(P ) ⇒ either Qv = pi
λ(P )
v , or the restriction of Qv to {a, b} is b ≻ a,
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and these two facts give the assertion of claim 1.
To check [∗∗], notice that if v ∈ Iλ(P ) and Pv 6= Qv, because of [∗] either (iii) or (iv) is true
and consequently the restriction of Qv to {a, b} is b ≻ a. ✷
proof of claim 2: Quite similarly to what before, by definition of ψ, we have that
Q ∈ Pa(pi
λ(Q),Fλ(Q)). In its turn this means:
{
D(a,Q) ∩ Icλ(Q) ∈ Fλ(Q)
[∗′] v ∈ Iλ(Q) ⇒ either Qv = pi
λ(Q)
v , or the restriction of Qv to {a, b} is a ≻ b.
Since for voters in D(a,Q) we can only have either (i) or (ii), we recognize that D(a,Q) ⊆
D(a, P ), and by the superset closedness we have
D(a, P ) ∩ Icλ(Q) ∈ Fλ(Q).
We also have that
[∗∗′] v ∈ Iλ(Q) ⇒ either Pv = pi
λ(Q)
v , or the restriction of Pv to {a, b} is a ≻ b,
and these two facts give the assertion of claim 2.
For [∗∗′], notice that if v ∈ Iλ(Q) and Pv 6= Qv, because of [∗
′] we have (ii) and consequently
the restriction of Pv to {a, b} is a ≻ b. ✷
We can now move to the proof of
P ⊐
ψ(P )
Q ⇒ ψ(Q) = ψ(P ),
in the case that ψ(P ) = b. We are not losing any generality in this since the case that
ψ(P ) = a can be treated similarly by means of an obvious modification of claims 1 and 2.
Suppose the index λ(P ) is finite. Then we have by claim 1 that λ(Q) ≤ λ(P ). Conse-
quently if ψ(Q) = a, by claim 2 we get λ(Q) = λ(P ) and also P ∈ Pa(pi
λ(P ),Fλ(P )) which
contradicts the assumption that ψ(P ) = b.
Suppose now that λ(P ) = ∞. This means, by definition of ψ, that ψ(P ) = b = x. It
follows that if ψ(Q) = a, it must be true that λ(Q) < ∞, then again claim 2 applies and
λ(P ) should be finite. ✷
5 The structure theorem
In this section we shall see that every CSP scf φ defined on all weak profiles, whose range
is {a, b}, can be represented by means of the formula (⋆) in Definition 4.1. In order to
achieve this result we shall first identify particular classes of profiles based on top choice
18
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only (choice between a and b), that necessarily have to go to prescribed values. This is
essentially the content of the following lemma.
Let {φ = x}, with x ∈ A, denote the set of all profiles P attaining value x under φ, i.e.
φ(P ) = x.
Proposition 5.1 Let φ : P → A be CSP. Assume that the range of φ is {a, b}. Then there
exists a unique superset closed family F of coalitions such that, if pi is the empty profile,
one has: Pa(pi,F) ⊆ {φ = a}, and Pb(pi,F) ⊆ {φ = b}.
proof: Take the family F accordingly to Theorem 1.1 (i) applied to the restriction of φ
to the subset of P of all strict profiles. We show the implication
(+) D(a, P ) ∈ F ⇒ φ(P ) = a.
Similarly one can obtain the other implication
(++) D(b, P ) ∈ F◦ ⇒ φ(P ) = b.
Let P be an arbirary profile. We can assume that the coalition D(a, P ) is a proper subset
of V 12. Let us take two strict orderings S1 and S2 on A that guarantee a ≻
S1
b and b ≻
S2
a,
and define a strict profile P̂ in the following way.
P̂v =
{
S1, for v ∈ D(a, P )
S2, for v /∈ D(a, P ).
Since D(a, P ) = D(a, P̂ ) and the implication we need to prove is true for strict profiles
(as Theorem 1.1 (i) says), we have that φ(P̂ ) = a. We also have φ([PD(a,P ), P̂D(a,P )c ]) = a,
otherwise the coalition D(a, P ) manipulates the profile [PD(a,P ), P̂D(a,P )c ] by presenting P̂ .
We can conclude φ(P ) = a as desired since otherwise the coalition D(a, P )c manipulates
the profile [PD(a,P ), P̂D(a,P )c ] by presenting P .
According to point 3. of Remark 3.3, we can rewrite the above implications (+) and (++)
respectively as Pa(pi,F) ⊆ {φ = a}, and Pb(pi,F) ⊆ {φ = b}. For the uniqueness of
F , the same argument used in the proof of [5, Proposition 2.9 ] 13, applies. ✷
We are now ready to state our representation theorem. It says that all CSP scfs are
necessarily scfs of ψ-type.
Let us recall that: a profile of unanimous indifference between a and b is a profile under
which all voters are indifferent between the two alternatives.
Theorem 5.2 Let φ : P → A be a scf which is coalitionally strategy-proof and has range
{a, b} ⊆ A of cardinality two. Let pi be a profile of unanimous indifference between the
alternatives a and b, and set x = φ(pi).
12Otherwise we just use the Pareto optimality (see Remark 2.5).
13For the uniqueness of the family there called F0.
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Then, we can find a double collection 〈Π, F〉 = 〈(piλ)0≤λ<β, (Fλ)0≤λ<β〉 with respect to
{a, b} such that the function φ coincides with the ψ-type function associated with 〈Π, F〉
and x.
Moreover, the dual families F0 and F
◦
0 are both nonempty,
14 and the ordinal β is finite if
V and A are both finite.
6 Appendix: the proof of Teorem 5.2
The proof will be achieved by transfinite induction. Before going into the details of the
proof, it is convenient to adopt some notation.
(N1) The elements of P , i.e. all profiles, will be enumerated as P
0, P 1, · · · , P η, · · · : η < δ
where δ is some ordinal. We shall denote by E this enumeration. In other words we
have P = {P η : η < δ} for a suitable ordinal δ. Note that δ is finite if V and A are
finite. To fix ideas we can assume that P 0 is the profile pi.
(N2) If we have a partial {a, b}-indifference profile pi
λ, and Fλ ∈ SSCF (V \ dom(pi
λ)), for
the set of profiles Pa(pi
λ,Fλ)∪Pb(pi
λ,Fλ) we shall use the notation Pλ, for the sake
of simplicity.
(N3) For every ordinal α, the set ∆α is defined as{
η < δ : P η ∈ P \
( ⋃
0≤λ<α
Pλ
)
and φ(P η) 6= x
}
=: ∆α.
(N4) When ∆α 6= Ø, Q
α stands for the profile whose index in the enumeration E is the
first element of ∆α. In other words Q
α = P ηα, where ηα := min ∆α.
Notice that if α < β, then ∆α ⊇ ∆β, hence ηα ≤ ηβ .
The following is the key technical tool in order to obtain our representation theorem stated
in Theorem 5.2.
Lemma 6.1 Let φ : P → A be a scf which is coalitionally strategy-proof and has range
{a, b} ⊆ A of cardinality two. Let pi be a profile of unanimous indifference between the
alternatives a and b, and set x = φ(pi). Assume that
(i) pi0 is the empty profile, F0 is a superset closed family of coalitions on V with the
following property:
{φ = a} ⊇ Pa(pi
0,F0) and {φ = b} ⊇ Pb(pi
0,F0)
14Namely, they consist of coalitions.
Naturally, compare Theorem 5.2 with the combination of Corollary 4.3 and Theorem 4.4
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(ii) β is an ordinal,
(iii) 0 < α < β ⇒ ∆α 6= Ø, and α ≤ ηα,
(iv) for every 0 < α < β, correspondingly to the profile Qα, there exists a family Fα ∈
SSCF (V \ I(Qα)) such that, setting Iα := I(Q
α), piαv := Q
α
v (for all v ∈ Iα), we
have:
Qα ∈ Pα
15, pi /∈
⋃
0≤α<β
Pα,
{φ = a} ⊇
⋃
0≤α<β
Pa(pi
α,Fα), and {φ = b} ⊇
⋃
0≤α<β
Pb(pi
α,Fα).
Under the above assumptions we have that either one of the following holds true:
1. ∆β = Ø, and the function φ coincides with the ψ-type function associated with 〈Π,
F〉 and x, where the double collection 〈Π, F〉 consists of the piα, and the Fα for all
0 ≤ α < β;
2. ∆β 6= Ø, and for Q
β there exists a family Fβ ∈ SSCF (V \ I(Q
β)) such that, setting
Iβ := I(Q
β), piβv := Q
β
v (for all v ∈ Iβ) , we have:
Qβ ∈ Pβ \
( ⋃
0≤λ<β
Pλ
)
, Qβ /∈ {Qα : 0 < α < β}, pi /∈ Pβ, β ≤ ηβ,
{φ = a} ⊇ Pa(pi
β,Fβ), and {φ = b} ⊇ Pb(pi
β,Fβ).
proof of Lemma 6.1: We can distinguish two cases that will give rise to either 1. or 2.
Suppose that over P \ (
⋃
0≤α<β Pα) the function φ takes one value only. This value is
necessarily x. Then what stated in 1. is obviously true, given the assumptions.
Hence, let us assume that over P \(
⋃
0≤α<β Pα) the function φ has range {a, b}. According
to (N3) this is the same as ∆β 6= Ø.
By definition (N4), Q
β ∈ P \ (
⋃
0≤α<β Pα) and φ(Q
β) 6= φ(pi). To fix ideas, we can assume,
without loss of generality, that φ(Qβ) = a.
Set Iβ := I(Q
β) and notice that this is a nonempty set 16. Also notice that Qβ /∈ {Qα :
0 < α < β} since every Qα ∈ Pα. Since we know that ηα ≤ ηβ, we entail that ηα < ηβ,
otherwise we get Qα = Qβ which is false. Moreover β ≤ ηβ. Indeed, if not, we have β > ηβ,
then, setting ηβ = α, by assumption, from α < β, we have α ≤ ηα, hence ηβ ≤ ηα, whereas
we have just seen that the converse is true.
15Hence, by the definition (N4) of the profile Q
α, we have Qα ∈ Pα \
(⋃
0≤λ<αPλ
)
.
16For a profile P the condition I(P ) = Ø gives P ∈ P0. This is a consequence of (i) and what observed
in point 3. of Remark 3.3.
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The restriction of Qβ to Iβ is a partial {a, b}-indifference profile that we denote by pi
β, so
piβ = (Qβv )v∈Iβ .
We now associate to piβ a family Fβ on I
c
β according to the following procedure. In case
V = Iβ we set Fβ = {Ø} (hence the dual family F
◦
β is empty). In case Iβ is properly
contained in V , we distinguish two cases according to the cardinality of the range of the
restriction
φIc
β
(PIc
β
) := φ(piβ, PIc
β
)
of φ to the coalition Icβ.
Such a restriction alway takes value a since φIc
β
(QβIc
β
) = φ(piβ, QβIc
β
) = φ(Qβ). It may be
possible that b is never attained by means of the restriction. In this case we define Fβ as
the power set of Icβ (hence the dual family F
◦
β is empty).
Notice that (see Remark 3.3) in both cases considered so far, we have
P ∈ Pa(pi
β,Fβ) iff for every voter v ∈ Iβ either Pv = pi
β
v = Q
β
v or a ≻
Pv
b,
(whereas Pb(pi
β,Fβ) is empty) from which we get
(⋄) Pa(pi
β,Fβ) ⊆ {φ = a}.
Indeed, for every P ∈ Pa(pi
β ,Fβ) we have
Profile P P Qβ a ≻ b
Icβ I
′
β I
′′
β
where I ′β = {v ∈ Iβ : Pv = Q
β
v} and I
′′
β = {v ∈ Iβ : v /∈ I
′
β & a ≻
Pv
b}, and by strategy-
proofness φ(P ) = a otherwise the coalition I ′′β (only the case this set is nonempty is signif-
icant) manipulates P by presenting QβI′′
β
.
In case the function φIc
β
takes both values a and b we can apply Proposition 5.1 to this
function determining a superset closed family Fβ of subcoalitions of I
c
β such that
D(a, PIc
β
) ∈ Fβ ⇒ φIc
β
(PIc
β
) = a,
D(b, PIc
β
) ∈ F◦β ⇒ φIcβ(PIcβ) = b.
From Definition 3.2 we have again as before the inclusion (⋄) to which we can add the
parallel inclusion
(⋄′) Pb(pi
β,Fβ) ⊆ {φ = b}.
Indeed, for every P ∈ Pb(pi
β,Fβ) we have
Profile P P Qβ b ≻ a
Icβ I
′
β I
′′
β
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where the only change is that I ′′β = {v ∈ Iβ : v /∈ I
′
β & b ≻
Pv
a}, and by strategy-proofness
φ(P ) = b otherwise the coalition I ′′β (only the case this set is nonempty is significant)
manipulates P by presenting QβI′′
β
.
Having, at this stage, defined piβ and Fβ, by construction we have
17 Qβ ∈ Pβ =
Pa(pi
β,Fβ) ∪Pb(pi
β,Fβ) and we have seen that Pa(pi
β,Fβ) ⊆ {φ = a}, and Pb(pi
β,Fβ) ⊆
{φ = b}.
To see that pi /∈ Pβ , we notice what follows.
In case that Fβ is the power set of I
c
β: then, because of formula (⋄) we have pi /∈ Pa(pi
β,Fβ)
and, on the other hand, Pb(pi
β,Fβ) is empty.
In case that Fβ comes from the application of Proposition 5.1 and, therefore, is a superset
closed family of subcoalitions of Icβ: observe that D(a, pi) ∩ I
c
β = D(b, pi) ∩ I
c
β = Ø, so
pi /∈ Pa(pi
β,Fβ) and pi /∈ Pb(pi
β,Fβ). ✷
We can now move to the proof of Theorem 5.2.
proof of Theorem 5.2: Setting λ = 0, I0 = Ø, and pi
0 = the empty profile, we define
the family F0 by appealing to Proposition 5.1.
Notice that none of the profiles unanimously indifferent between a and b belongs to P0.
We can now distinguish two cases according to the fact that:
• Case 1: over P \P0 the function φ takes one value only.
• Case 2: over P \P0 the function φ has range {a, b}.
Suppose we are in case 1. Then, the value attained by φ is necessarily x. Hence, the
theorem is proved since φ coincides with the ψ-type function associated with the double
collection 〈pi0,F0〉 and x (i.e. β is one).
On the contrary, suppose that over P \P0 the function φ has range {a, b}. In this case if
we set β = 2, all the assumptions of Lemma 6.1 are satisfied. Indeed, note that the present
case exactly says that ∆1 6= Ø, and what is needed to show is that for the profile Q
1 18
there is a family F1 ∈ SSCF (I
c
1) such that setting pi
1 = Q1I1, we have Q
1 ∈ P1, pi /∈ P1,
{φ = a} ⊇ Pa(pi
1,F1), and {φ = b} ⊇ Pb(pi
1,F1).
The argument is pretty much the same as in the proof of Lemma 6.1, and we summarize
it in the following.
The set I1 := I(Q
1) is nonempty. To the partial {a, b}-indifference profile pi1 = (Q1v)v∈I1
we associate a family F1 on I
c
1 according to the following procedure. In case V = I1 we set
17See Definition 3.2. Precisely, due to the assumption that φ(Qβ) = a, the profile Qβ ∈ Pa(pi
β ,Fβ).
18Trivially 1 ≤ η1.
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F1 = {Ø} (hence the dual family F
◦
1 is empty). In case I1 is properly contained in V , we
distinguish two cases according to the cardinality of the range of the restriction
φIc
1
(PIc
1
) := φ([pi1, PIc
1
])
of φ to the coalition Ic1.
Such a restriction always takes value φ(Q1) since φIc
1
(Q1Ic
1
) = φ([pi1, Q1Ic
1
]) = φ(Q1). It is
possible that x is never attained by φIc
1
. In this case we define F1 as the power set of I
c
1
(hence the dual family F◦1 is empty).
In case the function φIc
1
takes both values a and b we can apply Proposition 5.1 to this
function determining a superset closed family F1 of subcoalitions of I
c
1 such that
D(a, PIc
1
) ∈ F1 ⇒ φIc
1
(PIc
1
) = a, and D(b, PIc
1
) ∈ F◦1 ⇒ φIc1(PIc1) = b.
Having, at this stage, defined F1, we can verify that
(⋄) Pa(pi
1,F1) ⊆ {φ = a},
(⋄′) Pb(pi
1,F1) ⊆ {φ = b},
Q1 ∈ P1 = Pa(pi
1,F1) ∪Pb(pi
1,F1), and pi /∈ P1.
Once the assumptions of Lemma 6.1 have been proved, by this lemma, either we get that
φ is the ψ-type function associated to the double collection 〈(pi0, pi1), (F0,F1)〉 and x, or it
will be possible to repeat the application of Lemma 6.1 (with β = 3) since we shall have
∆2 6= Ø and the family F2, the profile pi
2 = Q2I2 with:
Q2 /∈ {Q1}, 2 ≤ η2,Q
2 ∈ P2 \ (P0 ∪P1), pi /∈ P2, Pa(pi
2,F2) ⊆ {φ = a}, Pb(pi
2,F2) ⊆
{φ = b}.
Then, either we get that φ is the ψ-type function associated to the double collection
〈(pi0, pi1, pi2), (F0,F1,F2)〉 and x, or we again can apply Lemma 6.1 (β = 4) ... We can
proceed by transfinite induction. The induction procedure will stop at an ordinal γ ≤ δ
when the function φ takes only one value on the set
{
η < δ : P η ∈ P \
(⋃
0≤λ<γ Pλ
)}
.
If A and V are finite the process clearly stops after finitely many steps. ✷
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